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The political cost to any British government of giving way on
the Falklands would be prohibitively high and there is no
strong need to pay it
George Philip argues that the war between the UK and Argentina changed the
politics surrounding the Falkland Islands. Prior to 1982, the government was looking for a
way to transfer authority. Now, since the memory of the war is still very much in the public
mind, the British position is verging on intransigence.
A well-attended meeting at LSE in May to discuss ways f orward f or UK-Argentina
relations vis-a-vis the Falklands included the participation of  Argentine Ambassador Alicia
de Castro and John Hughes, f ormer Brit ish ambassador to Argentina. The general quality
of  the discussion was high, though I very much doubt that anybody’s mind was changed as a result. That
is because the issue is f undamentally polit ical. Scholarly re- interpretations of  the –in any case disputed-
history of  the Islands no longer cut much ice.
Ambassador de Castro spoke well and made some good points. Argentina has been a democracy since
1982 and I personally don’t think that the Falkland Islanders would have much to f ear if  a f uture Brit ish
government were to cut a deal with Argentina. There is a large ‘Anglo’ community in Argentina which
shows no sign of  being treated worse than any other Argentine cit izens. There was also a horrible kind
of  equality under the military. The Junta killed more Argentine civilians than Brit ish soldiers. The Junta has
in any case been completely discredited and many human rights abusers are now either dead or in gaol.
Moreover, the numbers of  people involved are small even if  the Falklanders decided not to stay on af ter
a deal. In such an eventuality there would hardly be more human disruption than is caused routinely by
such inf rastructural developments as a new road or airline terminal.
The same of  course can be said of  Argentina. Argentina can live perf ectly well without the Falklands,
indeed it has done so since 1982, and they have enough economic problems to occupy policymakers f ully
–problems that potentially have an ef f ect on 40 million or so people and not just a very f ew thousand.
No. The real issue is polit ical. Britain went to war with Argentina in 1982 and blood was shed on both
sides. The f act of  the invasion is still on the public record and will not soon be f orgotten. Moreover this
was a war that Britain might easily have lost. It was no f ormality. I was at an earlier conf erence in Kent at
which John Nott spoke. Nott was the Brit ish Minister of  Def ence at the time of  the invasion and, in
answer to a question, replied that he would personally not have sent the Naval Task Force to the South
Atlantic. It seemed to him too risky. The historical documents that are starting to be released on the US
side also show that most senior members of  the Reagan administration thought like Nott rather than like
Thatcher. This is one case in which the role of  the individual did matter decisively. If  the Task Force had
not been sent, of  course, Argentina would have won and the Islands would be Malvinas.
This recent history seems to me to indicate two serious weaknesses in the Argentina posit ion. One is
Brit ish public opinion. The Brit ish are a tradit ion minded people who are slow to change their ways of
thinking. Anybody who doubts this should consider the popularity of  the royal Diamond Jubilee earlier this
month. I am of ten irritated by silly jokes about Hitler and World War Two, and then remember that many
people in Britain still celebrate Guy Fawkes day (Guy Fawkes was executed in 1605). Brit ish public opinion
is also rather romantic about the Navy (‘Britannia rules the waves’) especially as we now barely seem to
have one, and the South Atlantic conf lict was largely a naval operation, at least on the Brit ish side.
Memories of  the South Atlantic conf lict are now part of  Brit ish polit ical culture and that will not change in
my lif etime. This is also something of  which the Falkland Islanders themselves are very much aware, and
they have themselves used the symbolism of  tradit ional Britain in their quest f or popular support. The
polit ical cost to any Brit ish government of  giving way on the Falklands would be prohibit ively high and
there is no strong need to pay it.
The other constraining f actor has to do with the scale of  the Brit ish relationship with Latin America. This
is quite limited. If  we exclude Mexico and Colombia, which really don’t care about the Falklands, then
Britain has f ew signif icant interests in the region and theref ore f ew potential sources of  vulnerability f or
Argentina to exploit. This was bought out, ironically, by a speech given last year by Foreign Secretary
William Hague, at Canning House in which he admitted that successive Brit ish governments had
neglected Latin America and promised that this would change. Since then there has been turmoil in the
Middle East, greater f iscal austerity in Britain and crisis in Europe. Given the scale of  some of  these
problems, Latin American issues have once more vanished f rom the Brit ish parliament and press. The
only real headline issue involving Latin America- with the possible exception of  the Jeremy Clarkson
af f air-  has been the renewed Cold War with Argentina over the Falklands and that is surely not what
Hague had in mind when he talked of  higher prof ile relationships. As an academic Latin Americanist, all
that I have noticed f rom the present government have been cuts in scholarship money and a tightening
of  visa regulations.
This leads to an ironic conclusion. The invasion of  the Falklands in 1982 was surely unethical but it was
not stupid. It might easily have succeeded. I do not subscribe to the ‘mad act of  a Fascist junta’
explanation f or what happened. The better explanation is that the invasion was an extreme example of
realist amorality – where there is indeed a clear link to the mentality of  the ‘dirty war ’. Today Argentina is
a democracy and can credibly claim that its domestic circumstances have changed. I certainly believe that
they have. But the current Argentine establishment, many of  whose members suf f ered under the military,
have had to pay a polit ical bill run up by the Junta.
Meanwhile the Brit ish ‘take’ on the issue has moved in the direction of  intransigence. In 1981 the Foreign
Of f ice was trying to f ind a means of  giving the Falklands away. Now it knows much better than to try. “It ’s
the polit ics, stupid’ –and the war changed the polit ics decisively.
Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of the British Politics and Policy blog,
nor of the London School of Economics. Please read our comments policy before posting.
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